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INTRODUCTION  
The United Nations's involvement in peace operations and peace-building in Africa has 
been inconsistent, ranging from complete failures to some celebrated success stories. This 
article assesses UN attempts to end the cycles of violence and destruction in Angola and 
Mozambique. Its main objective is to highlight some important lessons learned. The 
article first draws attention to the fact that the peace accords in both countries were 
designed to end bloody and protracted proxy wars - the twin legacies of Cold War and 
apartheid distabilization. However, especially for Angola, the peace accord did not 
represent a resolution of the main underlying internal problems. The civil war in Angola 
involved not only high political stakes but even greater economic interests given its 
immense natural resources, particularly oil and diamonds. Lack of a consensus on how 
Angola's wealth should be divided in a post-conflict era ultimately booby-trapped the 
entire peace operation. Political consensus in Mozambique was easier to achieve because 
the resource issue was largely absent.  
Second, the articles suggests that the different outcomes of UN efforts in Angola and 
Mozambique reflect the level of international commitment and resources mobilized. 
Inability or unwillingness to commit enough resources to support peace-building efforts 
in Angola ultimately rendered the entire UN operation ineffective. The second United 
Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II),1  was not given the mandate nor the 
means to be a central player in the complex process of implementing the peace accord. In 
contrast, in Mozambique - despite some problems related to the demobilization of 
soldiers - the commitment of adequate resources together with active international 
involvement ultimately guaranteed success.  
Third, the article highlights some important lessons learned from the UN's experience in 
Angola and Mozambique. The contrasting results in the two cases show the importance 
of realistic mandates coupled with adequate commitment of resources. In Angola, the 
mandate to "monitor and verify" was unsuitable for such a complex situation. 
Furthermore, the allocation of meager resources to carry out such a mandate also 
contributed to its failure. In Mozambique, the UN's direct and dynamic involvement 
together with adequate human and material resources decisively contributed to success.  
Another important lesson relates to the types of structures designed to support peace-
building efforts. In the case of Angola, the main structure upon which the entire operation 
was entrusted was rigid and ineffective. Again, this contrasts starkly with the experience 
in Mozambique where the UN's mission went beyond peacekeeping and managing the 
implementation of the peace accord that ended the civil war. The UN operation in 
Mozambique also assisted in the "political evolution of a society previously riven by 
conflict."2  Finally, the most important lesson learned is related to the need for creating a 
unified, professional armed forces well ahead of elections. Failure to do so in Angola 
eased the relapse into war.  
Fourth, the article assesses the prospects for long-term peace in Angola as the UN 
prepares to terminate its peace operation at a time when the two warring factions appear 
ready to reignite the war after a four-year period of unstable peace kept perilously in 
place with UN supervision. The article concludes by suggesting that the UN must take a 
more long-term approach to peacebuilding. It must be viewed as a critical component of a 
process that also involves enhancing governance and reconstituting civil society, as a first 
step to reversing political, administrative and economic decay that causes much human 
misery in Africa and elsewhere.  
PEACE OPERATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
As Paul Diehl points out, the end of the Cold War has resulted in a "major power 
retrenchment"3  around the world. However, given the anarchic nature of the international 
system, conflicts - both inter- and intra-state - still occur. In the absence of major power 
involvement, the UN has been called upon to "promote the termination of armed conflict 
or the resolution of longstanding disputes."4  The UN has responded to these demands for 
peace operations with increasing frequency in spite of its limited capabilities.5  UN peace 
operations involve many tasks including: observing compliance with peace agreements, 
creating buffer zones, controlling entry into buffer zones, monitoring arms limitations, 
overseeing demobilization/ demilitarization, reporting violations, mediating among 
parties, overseeing electoral activity, and facilitating reconstruction.6   
This role, assumed with increased frequency by the UN, has always been problematic 
inasmuch as it is not contemplated in the UN Charter. The Charter, based as it is on the 
principle of collective security, only makes provisions for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes between states (Chapter VI) and the use of force to restore international peace 
and security (Chapter VII). Enforcement actions to maintain international peace and 
security have to be approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).7  
However, since all permanent members of the Security Council have veto power, the 
implementation of the spirit of the UN Charter became highly problematic during the 
Cold War. The ideological divisions which characterized international relations during 
most of the post-World War II period were also reflected in the Security Council. 
However, since the post-1945 era posed its own set of international challenges requiring 
immediate attention, the concept of peacekeeping was developed as a way to circumvent 
such ideological divisions and find peaceful solutions to international conflicts. Thus 
peacekeeping, as an instrument used to help maintain international peace, came about 
without "a particular theory or doctrine" behind it.8  This innovative approach was first 
used during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948. Twelve other peacekeeping operations 
would be conducted by the UN during the Cold War period.  
One of the most extensive of these operations was undertaken in Africa. The UN 
peacekeeping mission in Congo, from 1960 to 1964, was its first foray into Africa. This 
mission was designed to help alleviate the human suffering that resulted from the 
unplanned and haphazard process of decolonization in that vast former Belgian colony. 
The complexity of the situation on the ground, compounded by intense disagreements in 
the Security Council, contributed to the UN's failure to fulfill its mandate. The impact of 
this failure was profound and long-lasting. According to one observer, "The Congo 
experience was as traumatic for the United Nations as was the Vietnam War for the 
United States."9  This early debacle contributed to the UN's reluctance to intervene 
elsewhere in Africa during the Cold War.  
Ironically, the momentous changes that have taken place in the international system since 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 
have further increased demand for UN peace operations. With the increasing number and 
intensity of intra-state conflicts - reflecting a collapse of the "order" that existed within 
the two opposing camps during the Cold War - the UN has been called upon to expand its 
role beyond a state-centric approach to "maintain international peace and security." The 
UN is now being asked to devote considerable resources to assist in the resolution of 
various inter-state conflicts. However, without a framework for intervention to solve such 
conflicts, the UN's record has been mixed. In some cases, like Mozambique, UN peace 
operations have been successful.10  In the case of Angola, however, UN peace operations 
have resulted in failure.  
CONTEXTS AND CONSTRAINTS  
The collapse of the Portuguese colonial regime in 197411  precipitated profound 
transformations in southern Africa that eventually led to processes of democratic 
transition in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Ironically, the former Portuguese 
colonies in the region - Angola and Mozambique - have not fared nearly as well. By the 
early 1990s, long years of civil war coupled with economic mismanagement and 
widespread corruption had brought both countries to the anarchical stage that Robert 
Kaplan wrote about in his celebrated article.12  Angola and Mozambique were on the 
verge of joining the growing list of collapsed states in Africa.  
Important domestic, regional and international factors were threatening the viability of 
these new and fragile states: the departure of the settler communities and subsequent 
mismanagement had driven their economies to ruin; civil wars, fuelled by South African 
interventions, had paralyzed the already weak states, rendering them ineffective inasmuch 
as their reach and authority outside the state capitals and a handful of major cities was 
decreasing rapidly, resulting in their incapacity to provide security - let alone law and 
order - to citizens; the authority of the state in both countries was being further 
challenged by two powerful armed groups - the National Union for Total Independence 
of Angola (UNITA) and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) - which ruled 
over a large portion of the country with population and a working political-military 
apparatus with an organized, albeit primitive, economy. Both UNITA and RENAMO 
were financed by Western countries and the apartheid regime in South Africa as the local 
executors of Western policies to contain Soviet influence in southern Africa.13  In this 
sense, the proxy wars in Angola must also be understood within the Cold War context.  
By the early 1990s the ruling Marxist parties in Angola and Mozambique - Popular 
Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Front for Liberation of 
Mozambique (FRELIMO), respectively - had lost the capacity to govern. Complete 
breakdown in governance was avoided only through the massive engagement of 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOS)14  while foreign armies - Cuba in 
Angola and Zimbabwe and Tanzania in Mozambique - prevented military defeat. Given 
this situation, the survival of the state in both Angola and Mozambique demanded an end 
to the civil wars and the establishment of an open, multiparty political system as a first 
step in a comprehensive process of state reconstitution. Thus, on 31 May 1991, MPLA 
and UNITA signed the Bicesse Peace Accord15  as a first step in what was expected to be 
a peaceful transition to elected government. Similarly, on 4 October 1992, FRELIMO 
and RENAMO signed a peace accord in Rome.16  Given the fragility of the state in these 
two former Portuguese colonies, the UN was expected to facilitate both transition 
processes through peace operations.  
Although Angola and Mozambique share important similarities in terms of historical 
experiences - they are both former Portuguese colonies that achieved independence after 
protracted wars of national liberation and were (mis)ruled by former Marxist 
governments that supported the struggle for liberation in southern Africa - their transition 
to peace and elected government produced different outcomes. Angola's aborted 
transition did not end the cycle of war, while Mozambique, in spite of some serious 
problems described below, has succeeded in ending the war and has put in place the basis 
for democratic government centered around a vibrant parliament and enriched by a re-
emergent civil society.  
On 29 and 30 September 1992 Angola held its first multiparty, internationally supervised 
elections. The governing MPLA won a parliamentary majority of 53.7 percent, compared 
to 34.1 percent for UNITA. In the presidential elections the incumbent, José Eduardo dos 
Santos of MPLA, won 49.7 percent of the vote to UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's 40.1 
percent. Since dos Santos came six-tenths of one percent short of the 50 percent needed 
to win an outright victory, a runoff presidential election had to be contested. However, 
UNITA questioned the legitimacy of the entire electoral process and rejected the validity 
of the results which were sanctioned by the UN and other international observers. After 
declaring that massive fraud had taken place, it reignited the civil war by militarily 
occupying large portions of the country. In a gambit reminiscent of events following 
independence in 1975, UNITA attempted to take the capital city. Fighting for control of 
Luanda began on 30 October. After several days of intense fighting the government 
prevailed. Several senior UNITA officials, including its vice-president Jeremias 
Chitunda, were killed. Another peace process had collapsed and, once again, Angola 
reverted to full-scale civil war.  
Ironically, the unraveling of the peace process in Angola came at a time when the UN 
was embarking on a much more successful mission in Mozambique. On 27 to 29 October 
1994, 90 percent of the 6.4 million registered voters cast their ballots in the first ever 
presidential and legislative elections.17  In the presidential election, the incumbent, 
President Joaquim Chissano, polled 53.3 percent to RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama's 
33.7 percent. FRELIMO won the legislative election with 44.3 percent, followed by 
RENAMO with 37.8 percent.  
Despite maintaining that there were serious irregularities in the electoral process, 
Dhlakama accepted the outcome of the elections that had been certified as free and fair 
by the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) and more than 2,300 
international observers. By accepting the election results, Dhlakama was quashing 
insistent rumors that he would reignite the civil war in Mozambique, as Savimbi had 
done in Angola. In the end, Dhlakama accepted the results while insisting that, "the 
elections were not free and fair."18  Realistically, RENAMO had few military options. 
However, and perhaps more importantly, the international community had set up a trust 
fund to help RENAMO's metamorphosis from a murderous guerrilla group into a 
respectable political party.19   
With RENAMO committed to playing a peaceful role as FRELIMO's opposition in 
parliament, ONUMOZ, at a cost of nearly US$1 billion, could be declared a success and 
its 5,500 peacekeepers were withdrawn gradually. By the time the newly elected 
government took office in December 1994, only a small contingent of peacekeepers 
remained in Mozambique to provide mine clearance training.  
At about the same time that the international community was celebrating another success 
story in UN peacekeeping and peace-building in Mozambique, the two warring factions 
in Angola were reaching yet another peace accord under UN auspices to pave the way for 
a government of national unity.20  However, after four years of UN-sponsored efforts to 
cajole both sides to adhere to the accords they had signed, the UN is ready to leave 
Angola without achieving the main objective of its mission: to place this war-ravaged 
country on a path to peace. What factors account for the UN's different outcomes in 
bringing an end to the civil wars and setting both countries on a course toward peaceful 
and democratic development?  
At the domestic level in Angola, two important factors conspired against the peace 
process. First, the high level of mistrust between MPLA and UNITA that developed since 
the pre-independence period led to "a continued preference for military rather than 
political options."21  Thus, the two warring factions only reluctantly agreed to implement 
the Bicesse Peace Accords.  
Second, the peace accords that constituted the base for the implementation of the peace 
process - both Bicesse and Lusaka - ignored the question of how to share the country's 
wealth, especially oil and diamond revenues,22  which were a significant source of 
revenues to MPLA and UNITA respectively. Since coming to power on 11 November 
1975, the Angolan government controlled the oil producing regions in Cabinda, Zaire and 
Kwanza Norte. However, especially since the late 1980s, UNITA controlled most 
diamond mining in the Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. Since then, UNITA has simply been 
unwilling to surrender the diamond producing areas to the governing MPLA, especially 
since it regarded the government as corrupt. UNITA maintained that, after more than two 
decades of MPLA rule, the revenues from the exploration of Angola's vast oil and 
diamond resources have benefitted only a relatively small urban elite sympathetic to 
MPLA. The vast majority of the population, especially in rural areas where UNITA 
commands considerable support, has been forced to survive severe deprivation in a 
country where most structures of governance had collapsed. Given this situation, UNITA 
has demanded participation in the management of the funds accrued from the sale of oil 
and diamonds in order to prevent continuing enrichment of the ruling group and its 
clients. No adequate mechanism was devised to deal with this issue. Since, from 
UNITA's perspective, the Angolan government's inability to address important domestic 
problems, including corruption, economic mismanagement, and uneven distribution of 
wealth, was a major factor in the civil war, the inability to find an acceptable way of 
dealing with these pressing issues ultimately have contributed to the breakdown of the 
latest attempts to establish a durable framework for peace.  
In Mozambique, such domestic constraints were dealt with adequately. For example, 
ONUMOZ and other UN agencies worked in a number of areas to build trust and 
cooperation between FRELIMO and RENAMO. At the military/security level, 
ONUMOZ was able to ensure that the main provisions of the peace accord were adhered 
to. Once the ceasefire came into effect on 15 October 1992, ONUMOZ played a crucial 
role in keeping the two armed forces separated prior to their encampment in designated 
sites and the collection, storage and destruction of weapons. This was followed by the 
selection of troops from both sides to form the new Mozambican Defense Force 
(FADM). At the political level, ONUMOZ supervised the implementation of the peace 
accord's provisions regarding the creation of new political parties and preparation for 
multi-party elections. However, some of the most effective work to build trust and 
cooperation between the former antagonists was undertaken through humanitarian 
intervention. ONUMOZ and other UN agencies carried out an extensive humanitarian 
assistance program immediately after the signing of the Rome peace accord. This 
program, which included the delivery of food relief, repatriation of refugees and 
internally displaced persons, constituted an important first step in reestablishing 
economic and social normalcy.23   
The struggle for financial resources was also largely absent in Mozambique. Although 
the warring factions in Mozambique did not have resources - like Angola's oil and 
diamonds - to fight over, two trust funds24  were established to assist financially both 
RENAMO and other opposition political parties. This innovative feature of the UN peace 
operation in Mozambique reflected some of the bitter lessons learned in Angola where 
the meager resources committed by the international community were not sufficient to 
overcome some of the constraints discussed in this article.  
PEACEKEEPING "ON THE CHEAP"  
The peace operation in Angola failed largely because of the UN's inability to engage 
sufficient resources to compel the two warring factions to abide by the peace accord they 
had signed in May 1991.25  Ironically, the end of the Cold War, in which Angola had 
played a conspicuous part, at least in terms of superpower rivalry in Southern Africa, did 
not benefit that country. In fact, it can be argued that the end of bipolarity and the dawn 
of a new era of cooperation revolving around the UN and other international 
organizations produced a new set of pressures and demands including a scarcity of 
international resources for peace-building and peacekeeping. Now, Angola had to 
compete with other countries around the world for both attention and resources. As a 
result, the international community, particularly the United States and Russia, were not as 
willing to employ the same resources to make peace in Angola in the 1990s, as they both 
had been to make war in the 1970s and 1980s. In the end, the adversaries in Angola kept 
their armies intact, making a return to war inevitable.  
It is worth remembering that UNAVEM was not created to enforce the implementation of 
the Bicesse Peace Accord. As mentioned earlier, it was created on 20 December 1988 to 
monitor the withdrawal of the 50,000 Cuban military contingent from Angola, as part of 
the settlement that led to Namibia's independence.26  This mission was made up of 70 
military observers and 20 civilian officials from ten countries,27  and was given a 31-
month mandate, beginning with its deployment one week before the start of the Cuban 
withdrawal, and ending one month after the completion of the withdrawal.  
On the eve of the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accord, the UNSC agreed to extend 
UNAVEM's mandate. The renewed mission, UNAVEM II, would become a 24-nation 
multinational force with the mandate to monitor the ceasefire between the Angolan 
government and UNITA. A budget of $132.3 million and 548 personnel were allocated to 
this mission, which began its deployment on 1 July 1991.28   
UN personnel comprised 350 military observers and 90 police officers. The military 
observers were given the task of ensuring that the provisions of the peace accord, 
regarding the encampment of government troops in 27 zones and UNITA in 23 others 
zones, were respected. They were also deployed in 12 critical areas and had additional 
responsibilities of conducting patrols over the entire country. UNAVEM II also included 
90 international police officers whose main task was to ensure the functioning of a new, 
integrated national police force.  
On 24 March 1992, the UNSC unanimously approved the expansion of UNAVEM II and 
the enlargement of its mandate. A 400-person division was added to the existing mission 
to monitor and evaluate the operations and impartiality of the electoral authorities at all 
levels in the legislative and presidential elections. This division was expected to operate 
in all the 18 provinces of the country to monitor and verify the three main phases of the 
electoral process, including the registration of voters, the electoral campaign, and the 
voting process. An additional US$18.8 million was allocated to UNAVEM II's budget for 
these purposes.29   
In both human and financial resources, UNAVEM II was, at best, a smaller reproduction 
of other UN operations, such as Namibia and Cambodia. In contrast to the UN role 
during Namibia's transition to independence, UNAVEM II did not organize the elections. 
The UN stressed that the Angolan elections were essentially a national, sovereign affair. 
Therefore, the UN assumed an auxiliary role - to observe and verify the elections, not to 
organize them. As the Secretary-General emphasized, "the government must be seen 
clearly to be taking charge of their organization, especially concerning logistics."30   
This was expected of a country emerging from a devastating civil war that had crippled 
most of its infrastructures. By contrast, in Namibia - a country of roughly 1 million 
people with most of its infrastructures and bureaucracy intact - the UN mounted a full-
scale operation involving more than 6,000 personnel.  
The minimalist stance by the UN in Angola was partly responsible for a transition 
process fraught with fear and tension. For example, UNAVEM II was not able to prevent 
armed UNITA cadres in civilian clothing from moving into towns across the country. Nor 
was it able to investigate widespread reports of large UNITA arms caches being hidden 
around the country. More importantly, it could not compel UNITA to surrender its heavy 
weapons and demobilize its troops as the peace accord required. Similarly, UNAVEM II 
was not able to prevent the Angolan government from hiding its best troops in the police 
force, which remained largely outside UN control and supervision. Thus, UNITA could 
claim that the creation of rapid intervention riot police units known as "ninjas," 
constituted sufficient evidence that the government was not serious about its purported 
intentions to create a truly national, unified army.  
Not surprisingly, UNAVEM II was unable to defuse escalating tension ahead of the 
country's first multi-party elections and was caught completely unprepared to deal with 
pre-electoral clashes between the former warring parties. Ultimately, UN incapacity, 
compounded by the difficulties inherent in a post-civil war society, including lack of 
infrastructures, weak bureaucracy, profound distrust between the former enemies, left 
vital features of the transition process unfulfilled. Ominously, the demobilization of the 
two armies and their fusion into a single, unified, non-partisan national army was not 
complete before elections were held. Furthermore, these difficulties impeded the 
government from carrying out some of the basic functions required during an election, 
such as efficient distribution and collection of ballot boxes. Given its limited resources, 
the UN mission was also unable to make a definitive pronouncement on whether the 
exercise had been free and fair in a manner that could satisfy all parties. In the end, given 
all of these shortcomings, the UN was not able to prevent the reversion to war. As the 
section below suggests, a more central role for the UN in Mozambique produced a better 
outcome, despite some difficulties.  
MOZAMBIQUE: A UN SUCCESS STORY  
The UN involvement in Mozambique reflected a desire not to repeat the blunders made in 
Angola. Thus, shortly after the signing of the peace agreement in Rome, the UN General 
Assembly approved a budget of US$140 million dollars to finance the initial phase of 
ONUMOZ, and the first steps were taken to deploy the 5,500 peacekeepers mandated to 
oversee the application of the peace agreement. ONUMOZ was given a clear and specific 
mandate to guide its operations in implementing the four major areas of the peace 
agreement: political, military, electoral and humanitarian.31  This level of clarity and 
specificity contributed significantly to the overall success of the mission.  
Another key factor in explaining the success of ONUMOZ resides in the fact that the UN 
insisted on the establishment of flexible mechanisms and timetables32  to help carry out 
the peace accord. In Angola the entire process was supervised by the Joint Political-
Military Commission (JPMC) made up of government and UNITA representatives, while 
the UN, along with the US, Russia, and Portugal sat in as observers. However, in 
contrast, ONUMOZ worked with many commissions created specifically to ease the 
implementation of the peace agreement. These commissions invariably included 
members of the Mozambican government, RENAMO and ONUMOZ. ONUMOZ, for 
example, was an integral part of two key commissions: the Supervisory and Monitoring 
Commission (CSC) that held primary responsibility for the day-to-day management of 
the transition process, and the Cease-Fire Commission (CCF) that dealt with incidents 
and/or complaints from either side. It also played an important role in the National 
Electoral Commission (CNE), Territorial Administration, Information, and Police 
Affairs.  
Arguably, however, the success of ONUMOZ rested largely on its leadership role in the 
Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces (CCFADM). The UN had the 
primary responsibility for managing the encampment and registration of up to 100,000 
government and RENAMO soldiers. The UN was also responsible for ensuring that a 
new national army of 30,000 was created with equal numbers of soldiers drawn from the 
government and RENAMO forces before elections took place.  
The peace agreement provided for 49 cantonment areas where the soldiers were 
assembled and registered. An important screening process then took place with some 
soldiers being selected to join the new armed forces while others were offered the 
opportunity to participate in a social adjustment program devised by the UN to help 
demobilized soldiers adapt to civilian life. Some soldiers opted to go back immediately to 
their places of origin. However, many others participated in various technical courses 
offered by the UN to ease their return to civilian life.  
By the end of March 1994, nearly 50,000 troops had been confined in UN cantonment 
sites. Many camps were already full and some had more than double the forces they were 
initially supposed to hold. Since the process had gone according to plan, ONUMOZ 
could concentrate on the establishment of a new army. The tragic situation in Angola had 
taught the UN that the formation of a national army before the elections was a basic 
condition for the success of the peace process. In Angola, the UN was unable to play a 
key role in the creation of a new, unified army partly due to its secondary role in the 
JPMC. It was only able to hastily proclaim the existence of a single armed forces two 
days before the elections were held,33  In reality, both the MPLA and UNITA kept the 
crack units in place as a precaution. What followed was an armed conflict even more 
devastating than the previous ones, with the warring factions emerging on the ground 
better equipped than ever before.  
The UN was determined not to repeat the mistake in Mozambique. Thus, various military 
centers for the new army were created to provide both training and the opportunity for 
former combatants to develop mutual trust. ONUMOZ also ensured that, as the soldiers 
presented themselves for registration, distribution of food and clothing accompanied the 
process of disarmament and collection of war material and, when possible, social and 
medical assistance was extended to their dependents.  
The UN had to exert great pressure on both the Mozambique government and RENAMO 
to commit themselves to a final date to end demobilization. There was some speculation 
that the government, in particular, was deliberately keeping back many of its best troops 
from the disarmament process. A major snag developed over the case of what became 
known as "the missing 12,000 FRELIMO troops." More than 18 months after the signing 
of the peace accord, the government claimed that its army was in fact some 12,000 
soldiers smaller than previously believed.34  Predictably, RENAMO was not impressed 
with this government "miscounting," and claimed that FRELIMO had been massaging 
the figures in order to hide soldiers.35   
But RENAMO was causing its own set of problems. FRELIMO complained, for 
example, that RENAMO was sending mostly children, elderly and disabled people to 
assembly areas while hiding its best soldiers.36  FRELIMO also observed, with concern, 
that the weapons delivered by RENAMO to ONUMOZ were old, obsolete, and did not 
correspond to the principle of "one man one weapon." In other words, RENAMO was 
allegedly stashing away its most sophisticated weapons for possible use in the eventuality 
of electoral defeat. Furthermore, and in open contradiction with the peace accord and its 
own public statements, RENAMO was allegedly continuing to ban the movement of 
citizens in areas under its control through arbitrary detention and intimidation.  
Given the long history of animosity between the former warring factions, mutual 
accusations during the transition process were anticipated even in the most optimistic 
scenarios. What was not envisaged, however, was that ONUMOZ's successes would 
create difficulties. One of the main problems arose from the fact that, having encamped 
most of the government and RENAMO soldiers, ONUMOZ had some difficulties in 
demobilizing them quickly enough. As a result, many soldiers became involved in 
mutinies and other disturbances because they wanted to know whether they would be 
demobilized or join the new national army.37   
In the Boane and Moamba assembly areas, for example, soldiers rioted and seized several 
UN personnel and their vehicles. They moved outside the camp and sacked shops, beat 
up people and caused UN personnel to flee the assembly area. In a worrying 
development, former combatants in other assembly areas began to adopt copycat tactics. 
Once they heard how their colleagues elsewhere had been able to secure immediate 
demobilization by seizing hostages or through another favorite tactic - blocking a major 
road for a day or two - riots quickly spread to other camps. Although no UN personnel 
were seriously hurt, FRELIMO and RENAMO commanders were regularly beaten up, 
innocent civilians were killed, raped, or saw their property looted.  
In one incident, mutinying soldiers of the 6th Tank Brigade returned to their barracks in a 
suburb of Maputo only after holding talks with the chief of the General Staff of the 
Mozambique Armed Forces. In this frightening episode, the Mozambique government 
blamed ONUMOZ for not deactivating the tanks used by the mutinying soldiers. 
However, the UN claimed that the Mozambique government did not allow ONUMOZ to 
disable the tanks by removing the firing mechanisms. In the end, active ONUMOZ 
mediation and cooperation between all parties enabled the resumption of the peace 
transition process along more peaceful lines.  
The nature and degree of ONUMOZ involvement in Mozambique's transition process 
helped defuse a potentially catastrophic pre-electoral crisis. One day before 
Mozambicans were expected to go to the polls RENAMO pulled out of the electoral 
process claiming to have uncovered a number of irregularities that endangered the whole 
electoral process. The alleged irregularities included:  
a lack of timely presentation and verification of all surplus voter registration and voting 
material; the fact that voting booth lists were not handed over to the Elections 
Administration Technical Secretariat, all leaders, and the political parties; and the fact 
that voter lists had not been put up at the voting places.38   
In a ominous move, Dhlakama declared, like Savimbi in Angola, that he would not 
accept the results if RENAMO lost.39  But, unlike in Angola, ONUMOZ was able to 
quickly convince Dhlakama that such actions would not be tolerated by the international 
community. Neighboring states, like Zimbabwe and South Africa, threatened strong 
measures, including military action, if RENAMO resumed the war. Dhlakama had no 
choice but to quickly rejoin the electoral process. In a face-saving statement he declared 
that:  
the international community gave us guarantees that irregularities reported by RENAMO 
will be investigated henceforth and other complaints will be looked into after elections . . 
.. I would like to announce that RENAMO will participate in elections.40   
This ensured that the elections took place without further incidents. When ONUMOZ's 
mandate expired with the inauguration of the newly elected president on 9 December 
1994, the UN could rightly congratulate itself for having achieved another peace-building 
success story. However, even in Mozambique, the UN's work was not complete, 
particularly in weapons collection, mine clearance and human rights monitoring.41  Aldo 
Ajello, the dynamic Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Mozambique, 
was forced to acknowledge that mine clearance had been one of ONUMOZ's weakest 
points. According to Ajello, the mine clearance program was planned to last two years, 
but it had to be completed in six months, mainly due to "administrative problems between 
New York and Maputo."42  Unfortunately, although the war has ended, innocent victims 
will continue to be killed and maimed in Mozambique for years, perhaps decades, to 
come.  
What lessons, then, can be derived from the UN's experiences in Angola and 
Mozambique? UN peace operations in these two countries demonstrate that a clear 
mandate, functional transitional institutions and emphasis on the creation of a unified 
army well-ahead of elections, are crucial factors in determining success or failure.  
REALISTIC MANDATES AND ADEQUATE RESOURCES  
One of the main differences between the UN missions in Angola and Mozambique can be 
found in the resources allocated respectively to UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ. Although 
severely constrained by lack of resources, UNAVEM II could have done a much better 
job if it had been given a more realistic mandate.43  Its weak mandate reflected the UN's 
general practice of not challenging the sovereignty of member states. However, as 
mentioned before, Angola's long years of civil war and economic mismanagement had 
brought the country to the verge of total collapse. Given this situation, a more realistic 
mandate for UNAVEM II would have included various measures to facilitate state 
reconstruction to be implemented concurrently with the peace process. This could have 
involved the restoration of state authority in areas still controlled by UNITA. Failure to 
do so emboldened UNITA which, predictably, undertook to undermine the power of the 
MPLA regime during the transition process through an intense campaign of politically 
motivated violence.  
The peace accord rested on the crucial assumption that both sides would cooperate in its 
implementation since, at least outwardly, all wanted peace. Instead, UNITA took full 
advantage of the prevailing situation - a weak government, a dysfunctional JPMC, and an 
ineffective UNAVEM II - to reinforce its own position, partly by preventing the 
government from extending its administration to areas it had lost during the civil war.  
Ironically, the UN unwittingly facilitated UNITA's attempts to keep tens of thousands of 
peasants under its control - instead of being allowed to return to their villages under the 
terms of the peace accord - because of the substantial quantities of food aid supplied to 
the area by UN agencies for distribution by UNITA officials.44  This reflected lack of UN 
"intelligence" regarding the domestic political situation.  
But there were other factors contributing to political violence. Contrary to what happened 
in Mozambique, the demobilized soldiers from both armies in Angola retained many of 
their weapons due to the haphazard way in which the demobilization process was 
conducted, again reflecting lack of proper UNAVEM II involvement. In many cases, 
soldiers simply did not report back to their barracks once the ceasefire was signed.  
The government's inability to handle increasing political violence during the period 
leading up to elections, was related to the fact that, paradoxically, peace had eroded its 
power by transferring authority to new structures like the JPMC. Tragically, however, 
these structures proved to be highly dysfunctional. Moreover, the troika of observers 
expected to act as the guarantors of peace in Angola (i.e., the United States, Russia and 
Portugal) were not prepared to use extraordinary measures, such as the use of military 
force, to enforce the peace agreements. All these factors contributed to a situation of 
uncertainty which quickly escalated into hostility and political violence. This ultimately 
booby trapped the entire peace process. Thus, the first multiparty elections in Angola 
amounted to little more than, "an exercise in make-believe."45  When the elections were 
held, many of the fundamental pre-conditions stipulated in the Bicesse Peace Accord 
remained unfulfilled. In other words, the implementation of the accord had failed to 
create a peaceful climate for political discourse and intercourse. The two main opponents, 
having been denied victory on the battlefield, were attempting to win the civil war at the 
ballot box. Both sides still had armies and UNITA still controlled the territory it occupied 
during the civil war.  
Given the situation described above, UNITA's return to war after the publication of the 
election results was to be expected. Angola's relapse into civil war was facilitated by two 
main factors: the structures designed to manage the transition process proved to be highly 
dysfunctional and the unified army had not yet been created.  
In Mozambique, as mentioned before, ONUMOZ was given a realistic mandate and 
adequate resources. Thus, at the end of its mission, ONUMOZ had succeeded in helping 
Mozambique make the difficult transition from civil war to a democratically elected 
government. This could not have been achieved without functional mechanisms to 
manage the peace operation.  
FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURES  
The primary responsibility for implementing the peace accord in Angola, unlike 
Mozambique, did not rest with the UN, but with a joint political-military commission, the 
JPMC. Predictably, this structure was incapable of managing a peaceful transition to the 
elections. In fact, it was not even able to prevent the peace process from beginning to 
unravel soon after the signing of the peace accord in Portugal.  
UNITA withdrew from this joint commission in the early stages of its existence, claiming 
that the MPLA government was not seriously implementing the peace accord, thus 
endangering the entire peace process. Although UNITA returned to the JPMC shortly 
afterwards, this body had lost most of its effectiveness. Without a strong and effective 
mechanism to manage the transition process, the country completed its descent into 
political turmoil, characterized by intimidation and violence. As a crucial mechanism for 
the transition process, the JPMC was poorly designed because many of the problems it 
had to face were not anticipated by the signatories of the peace accord.  
Again, this contrasts sharply with how the UN managed its peace operation in 
Mozambique. Here, "the CSC was effectively in almost constant session."46  This 
commission, whose composition also included the ambassadors of France, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States, operated as a "mini-Security 
Council."47  This level of involvement in Mozambique resulted in the kind of legitimacy 
and leverage which the UN mission in Angola never had. International involvement was 
particularly needed to create unified armies as important cornerstones for sustainable 
peace.  
THE CENTRAL ROLE OF A NATIONAL, UNIFIED ARMY  
Under the Bicesse Peace Accord, the Angolan government and UNITA were expected to 
form a new 50,000-person united army from their estimated 250,000 troops and 
demobilize the remaining soldiers before elections were held. However, from the start, 
the process of assembling government and rebel troops was very slow, resulting in huge 
delays in the establishment of the new army. This slowness was caused by a number of 
logistical problems, including lack of food, shelter and transportation, in assembly areas. 
It was also a direct consequence of the UN's lack of involvement in this crucial aspect of 
the peace process. Margaret Anstee, the UN Secretary General Special Representative in 
Angola, would later recognize the absurdity of this fundamental omission. She argues 
that:  
While it was perfectly sensible to give the British, French and Portuguese the task of 
training the new force, the enterprise constituted such a critical element in the process 
that UNAVEM should at least have been given a role of verification and a seat in the 
CCFA (the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Angolan Armed Forces, under the 
CCPM).48   
Thus, not surprisingly, in a report to the Security Council, the Secretary General pointed 
out that, two and a half months after the assembly of troops was supposed to have been 
completed, barely 60 percent of the troops declared by both sides had been encamped in 
assembly areas.49  The report declared that such a state of affairs undermined confidence 
and imperilled the implementation of various other aspects of the peace accord.50   
UNITA claimed that it had concluded the process of confining its troops to UN-
controlled assembly areas just before the 15 November 1991 deadline stipulated by the 
JPMC. UNITA noted, however, that not all government troops had been encamped and 
suggested that many government soldiers were being transferred from the army into the 
police force to avoid demobilization.51  According to UNAVEM II's count, a total of 
95,634 troops (68,666 government troops and 26,968 from UNITA) had been assembled 
in 45 sites, compared with the projected total number of 165,440 troops that should have 
been in the assembly areas (115,640 government troops and 49,800 UNITA troops).52   
By early April 1992, it became clear that the provisions of the peace accord regarding the 
formation of a unified national army would not be met. Given the slow pace of 
implementing some of the crucial aspects of the peace accord, the UN and the foreign 
powers involved in overseeing the peace process had all but given up most attempts to 
meet the stipulated schedule for demobilizing approximately 250,000 soldiers and 
guerrillas, and forming a unified army before the elections. The British, Portuguese and 
French officers in charge of forming the new army had only succeeded in creating a 
unified command structure on paper.53  Thus, in a move that would prove fatal to the 
country's long-term unity and stability, the parties involved undertook to make the first 
serious revision of the peace accord. The government and UNITA decided to hold back 
on their initial pledge to demobilize all their soldiers or integrate them into the new 
national army. UNITA decided to keep at least 15,000 soldiers in reserve, while the 
government kept about 33,000 in reserve including a 6,000-strong air force and a 4,000-
strong navy.  
A month before the elections only about 25 percent of the combined soldiers had been 
demobilized and a mere 12 percent of the national army had been formed.54  It was 
becoming clear that Angola would not have one army, but three - the embryonic Angolan 
Armed Forces (FAA), FAPLA, and FALA55  - at election time.  
Pressured by the United States, Russia and Portugal - the troika of international observers 
to the peace process - the MPLA government and UNITA officially agreed to disband 
their armies on 27 September 1992, just 48 hours before the start of what were supposed 
to be the first fully free elections in Angola. However, the unity of the new armed forces 
only lasted a week. UNITA withdrew from the country's newly formed joint armed forces 
on 5 October 1992, thus setting the stage for another round of bloodletting.  
LESSONS NOT LEARNED  
The new round of fighting precipitated by UNITA's electoral defeat lasted for two years. 
By most accounts, it inflicted a level of devastation - both in human lives lost and 
infrastructure destroyed - worse than before. UNITA had clearly planned for the 
eventuality of electoral defeat. It had accepted, as a given, that MPLA would not 
surrender power through political means. Thus, UNITA used the temporary peace 
brought about by an externally imposed transition process to reorganize and reposition 
itself on the ground to cope with changing international and regional realities. The 
imminent cut-off of aid from the United States and South Africa forced UNITA into a 
desperate search for new sources of funding. For the rebels, the most accessible and 
plentiful source was in Angola itself, in the abundant supply of diamonds that could be 
found in the northeastern part of the country. Thus, UNITA deployed a substantial 
amount of its forces in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul provinces to protect what would 
become extensive diamond mining operations. Currently, UNITA is able to smuggle 
diamonds out of Angola via Zambia and Burundi to be sold on international markets, 
particularly in Antwerp.56  The control of this lucrative operation has enabled UNITA to 
resist MPLA's attempts to co-opt it into the government and the ruling party. UNITA 
prefers to wait until it has guarantees of its fair share of the country's wealth or the 
government collapses due to mounting domestic pressures.  
Since the signing of the Bicesse accord in 1991, UNITA adopted a two-track strategy for 
the peace process. On the one hand, it went through the motions of an electoral campaign 
and a make-believe demobilization process to appease the international community 
while, on the other hand, it maintained its best soldiers and weapons outside government 
control and continued to restock and resupply for the ever-present possibility of a 
resumption of the war.57  Its financial self-sufficiency assured for the foreseeable future - 
with the potential to earn up to $ 1 billion dollars per year for the next 50 to 60 years via 
the sale of diamonds58 - UNITA is in no hurry to reach a lasting political settlement.  
In the aftermath of the electoral fiasco, UNITA achieved military control of most of 
Angola before returning to the negotiating table in 1993. Exploratory talks were held in 
Addis Ababa before peace talks resumed in Lusaka under UN mediation.59  After more 
than a year of negotiations both parties signed a power-sharing agreement commonly 
referred to as the "Lusaka Protocol."60  Yet, as they were signing this document, which 
established a new framework for peace, government troops were driving out UNITA 
from most of the areas it had captured in 1992, including the rebels' headquarters at 
Huambo and their diamond mines in northeastern Angola. Without control of the 
diamond mines the government's army could "significantly damage UNITA's power 
base."61  This prompted UNITA to threaten a substantial escalation of guerrilla activities 
and make Angola ungovernable for "a few more years."62   
When the Lusaka peace accord was finally signed in November 1994, UNITA had been 
once again driven out of its stronghold in Huambo but had held on to the diamond mines 
in the northeastern provinces of Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul. The Lusaka accords 
provided for the demobilization of the rival armies and the integration of FALA into the 
national army. Its also made provisions for several government posts to be given to 
UNITA. To facilitate the implementation of the accord, the UN Security Council 
approved the deployment of UNAVEM III. This 7,000 strong multinational force was 
given the mandate of supervising the disarmament and encampment of UNITA and 
government soldiers prior to their integration into a unified national army.  
UNITA once again gave only lukewarm endorsement to the latest peace accord because it 
was confident that UNAVEM III63  would end its mission in failure, much like previous 
UN efforts in Angola. Even with the human and material resources that previous missions 
lacked,64  and an expanded mandate,65  UNAVEM III was never expected to ensure 
successful implementation of the Lusaka agreement, given its complexities 66  and the 
fact that neither party to the conflict was genuinely committed to peace. UNITA, in 
particular, calculated correctly that, given enough difficulties on the ground, the UN's 
own financial afflictions would result in considerable pressure in New York to bring 
UNAVEM III to a close with or without peace in Angola.67   
The fact that there was no enforcement clause in the Lusaka Protocol meant that UNITA 
could, single-handedly, thwart its implementation by simply delaying the quartering of its 
troops and handing over its weapons to the UN. The Lusaka Protocol stipulated a 180-
day period for the completion of quartering and disarmament of troops. However, three 
years later, this process had lost all credibility as UNITA sent only children and old men 
with rusty weapons to the UN quartering areas while its best troops and equipment were 
used to continue controlling most of the territory taken since the post-electoral debacle.68  
This suggests that the Lusaka Protocol has produced a different outcome than the one 
originally envisioned: UNITA is still strong enough, both militarily and financially, to 
continue playing the role of the spoiler indefinitely. Thus, once again in Angola, the UN 
has failed to properly assess the likelihood for peace, especially the commitment of both 
parties, before undertaking a peace mission.  
UNTIMELY DEPARTURE  
In light of the situation on the ground, the optimism generated by the signing of the 
Lusaka Protocol has disappeared. A new sense of pessimism has slowly and predictably 
crept in. This pessimism derives from the fact that both sides appear ready for another 
devastating round of fighting.69  Having lost patience due to UNITA's chronic and 
deliberate procrastination, the Angolan government has decided to forcibly extend state 
administration to the areas still under UNITA control, especially the diamond producing 
areas from which UNITA draws approximately $500 million dollars per year.  
The timing of the government's push to establish state control over UNITA-dominated 
areas reflects major regional changes, particularly the regime changes in the two Congos 
where presidents Mobutu Sese Seko and Pascal Lissouba were overthrown by rebellions 
supported by Angola. Mobutu, in particular, was a long-time ally of Jonas Savimbi and 
allowed his country to be used as the main funnel for weapons and other supplies for 
UNITA. Partly due to this relationship, the Angolan government backed Laurent Kabila's 
victorious insurgency. Angolan support at all levels, including both troops and military 
hardware, was decisive in the final push to take Kinshasa. Having helped to topple 
Mobutu in Congo, thus cutting off UNITA's main supply routes and stranding some of 
the rebel groups' best troops in the neighboring country,70  the Angolan government 
appears to have won the support of another key neighbor which could help to inflict a 
final and mortal blow against the rebels. Namibia is said to have "given agreement in 
principle to allow Angola use of its air base at Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi Strip and, in 
addition, to land an expeditionary force at Walvis Bay that would be moved north-east 
for an assault on the Unita stronghold of Jamba in the far south-east of Angola."71  Even 
with the help of its neighbors, the Angolan government is not expected to destroy 
UNITA. In recent months UNITA has displayed an unexpectedly strong military capacity 
and has been able to hold on to most disputed areas, including the diamond mines.72  In 
demonstrating a continuing fighting ability UNITA has, perhaps unwittingly, confirmed 
reports that most of the rebels had not been demobilized. The hard core of UNITA's 
troops had never been registered in the UN camps at all.  
While renewed fighting takes place throughout Angola, the UN has maintained its 
timetable for withdrawal,73  further adding to the sense of pessimism. The UN's exit from 
Angola is premature because it takes place at a time when its continuing involvement is 
most needed. On the ground, the legitimacy and capacity of the government of national 
unity, installed on 11 April 1997 is highly questionable. As constituted, it still precludes 
UNITA from exerting official control over the two major levers of economic power: oil 
and diamonds. Full acceptance of the present division of power would leave UNITA 
completely at the mercy of the government, especially from an economic/financial 
perspective. Thus, UNITA is not yet ready to give up its last means of survival; it is 
expected to continue fighting for what it considers to be its fair share of Angola's vast 
wealth.  
At the military level, the UN has yet to complete the key task of quartering UNITA 
troops and facilitating their incorporation into the national army. In fact, the UN efforts to 
demobilize UNITA troops and help integrate them in the national army has been a 
complete failure. UNITA registered 70,000 of its troops at the UN quartering camps. Of 
those, 11,000 joined the national army and 36,000 were demobilized. However, another 
23,000 deserted the UN camps.74  Moreover, there is no reliable follow-up mechanism to 
determine whether the demobilized soldiers have returned to their villages or to their 
original rebel bases. This means that the UN may have helped to house, feed and cloth 
UNITA's soldiers while they were pausing for a predictable resumption of the war.  
Partly due to the political and military situation prevailing in the country, but also due to 
gross mismanagement, the economy is in a shambles, teetering on the verge of 
collapse.75  Together all these factors have a negative effect on human security and 
prevent the emergence of a civil society with voice. Thus, instead of a cut-and-run 
approach to conflict resolution, the UN must find creative ways to handle this extremely 
complex situation. A reduced UN presence in Angola is inadequate to help solve this 
country's problems.  
CONCLUSIONS  
The UN's peace-building and peacekeeping efforts in Angola and Mozambique 
demonstrate that, in the final analysis, the success or failure of such missions hinges on 
several important factors, including a clear mandate, commitment of adequate resources 
from the start, and the willingness of the main internal actors to implement the peace 
accords they sign. In Mozambique, ONUMOZ had both a clear mandate and the means to 
play a pivotal role. ONUMOZ was given the mandate to manage the entire peace process. 
Also, the sizable UN presence in Mozambique served both as an incentive for the former 
enemies to implement the peace agreement they had signed and as a credible deterrent 
against any ploy to re-ignite the civil war. Thus, the success of the peace support 
operation in Mozambique suggests that the international community is still capable of 
rescuing collapsing societies.  
In Angola, UNAVEM II never had the mandate to manage the implementation of the 
peace process. Surprisingly, it was relegated to a secondary role. As such, it could not 
help solve Angola's multifaceted and multilayered crisis before elections took place. The 
severity of the crisis would have required initial arrangements for a much longer 
transition process in order to allow for the bolstering of credible governance and the 
reconstitution of civil society. Angola, like many other African countries, faces a "crisis 
of governance."76  This crisis is reflected in the "coercive and arbitrary"77  nature of the 
state, where government officials habitually follow their own interests without fear of 
accountability. In the particular case of Angola, this was further complicated by the fact 
that UNITA believed that after spending many years in the bush it was now their turn to 
pillage the country's wealth, as the MPLA government had done in the past.  
If the peace process is to work in Angola under UN supervision, the UN must necessarily 
take into account this crisis of governance. The UN must take steps to remedy political 
and administrative decay and initiate a process of political renewal that will ultimately 
lead to the establishment of a new order based on transparent, accountable governance, 
pluralistic institutions, respect for the rule of law, a free press and the protection of 
human rights. This would also entail working to strengthen elements of civil society to 
enable them to play a more significant role in the peace process. In sum, international 
efforts aimed at helping Angola end its long cycle of violence must move beyond the 
conventional practices of peacekeeping and peace-making to include greater attention to 
the equally important areas of deterrence, and peace enforcement and reconstruction.  
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